



sustainable solutions for ending hunger and poverty
Breaking the Links Between Conflict and Hunger in Africa
Ellen Messer and Marc J. Cohen
A
rmed conflicts frequently 
lead to the destruction of 
food systems. Often, warring 
parties manipulate
starvation as a deliberate tactic, using 
their control over access to food to 
attract and reward friends and humble 
and punish enemies. Such conflicts are “food
wars,” not only because hunger is used as a
weapon but also because food insecurity is
both an effect and cause of conflict.
In February 2004, United Nations
agencies calculated that over 45 million
people in developing countries experiencing
or recovering from conflict were in need of
food and other emergency humanitarian
assistance (see table). More than 80 percent
of those affected lived in Sub-Saharan Africa.
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       Table 1—People in Need of Food and Other Emergency Assistance in Sub-Saharan African
Conflict and Postconflict Countries, February 2004




Angola 2,500,000 6,400,000 Postconflict
Burundi 1,100,000 4,500,000 Active conflict
Central African Republic 2,200,000 1,600,000 Active conflict
Republic of the Congo 150,000 900,000 Postconflict
D.R. Congo (DRC) 6,500,000 38,300,000 Active conflict
Côte d’Ivoire 1,000,000 2,400,000 Active conflict
West Africa (Burkina Faso, Ghana,
Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Mauritania,
and Togo) 2,000,000 Refugees from Côte d’Ivoire and 
Liberia, repatriated workers
Eritrea 2,300,000 2,200,000 Postconflict, drought
Ethiopia 7,200,000 26,400,000 Pockets of active conflict, internally
displaced people (IDPs) from past 
conflicts, drought
Great Lakes Region (Burundi, DRC,
Rwanda,Tanzania, and Uganda) 1,100,000 Displacement, drought, disease, forced
recruitment of child soldiers
Guinea 300,000 2,300,000 Refugees from neighboring conflicts
Liberia 1,700,000 1,200,000 Shaky ceasefire
Mozambique 600,000 9,700,000 Postconflict
Sierra Leone 500,000 2,200,000 Postconflict
Sudan 3,600,000 7,700,000 Active conflict
Tanzania 2,400,000 15,200,000 Refugees
Uganda 2,400,000 4,500,000 IDPs, refugees
Sub-Saharan Africa 37,400,000 198,000,000
Developing World 45,200,000 842,000,000
Sources: Figures calculated by the authors using data from the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, and the World Food Programme.
Notes: In some instances, the population in need of humanitarian assistance includes refugees from other countries and may therefore exceed the total
food-insecure population of the country. Countries such as Zambia and Zimbabwe, which suffer from endemic food insecurity and unrest but are not in a
declared state of civil war, are excluded from this discussion.
I
nternational humanitarian relief and development
operations provide opportunities to build peace and
create sustainable food security, especially in situations
where operations are carried out with explicit frameworks
attending to human rights and sustainable livelihoods. Achieving
lasting peace is a complex proposition because there is no single
set of causes of conflict or a sure way to remove them.
Nevertheless, there are food and agricultural policy actions that
can foster peaceful outcomes that promote food security.
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      CURRENT STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY
AS EFFECT AND CAUSE OF
CONFLICT IN AFRICA
C
onflict causes food insecurity and, under most circum-
stances, depresses production and income from cash
crops and livestock.This reduction in production and
income further decreases food security and reduces the
coping capacity of those dependent on these sources for
their livelihood.According to the Food and Agriculture
Organization of the United Nations, conflict cost Africa over
$120 billion worth of agricultural production during the last
third of the 20th century. Given the importance of agricul-
tural livelihoods to overall economic well-being, especially in
conflict-prone countries in Africa, these losses were devas-
tating.The United Nations Children's Fund reports that con-
flict countries have also failed to make much improvement in
child malnutrition and mortality rates, in part because of the
destructive violence and in part because of underinvestment
in health, education, and nutrition programs relative to mili-
tary spending.
By contrast, the ways in which food insecurity currently
contributes to conflict are less well understood, including
the circumstances under which food insecurity triggers con-
flict. Recent theories of civil war, for example, ignore the
linkages between the agricultural sector, which employs the
majority of people, and other primary-commodity sectors,
which are usually implicated in funding arms and troops—
and in funding their warring political leaders.
Conflict in developing countries stems from a constella-
tion of factors, including ethnic rivalries and environmental
scarcities, as well as intergroup competition over resources
such as land, water, and development aid. In conflict situa-
tions, there is usually some combination of perceived unfair-
ness in resource distribution, injury to a group’s sense of
cultural identity, struggle for control over access to high-
value primary resources, and a precipitous decline in house-
hold incomes due to a natural disaster or a plunge in the
price of key mineral or agricultural commodities. Studies of
the economic correlates of war—or of the motives and
opportunities of the combatants—rarely investigate food
insecurity directly, although they often find that conflict is
strongly associated with factors closely related to food inse-
curity, for example, high infant mortality, destitution, inequali-
ty, and declining per capita incomes.
The 22 countries listed in the table have recently suffered
from some interrelated combination of conflict,underdevelop-
ment,and food insecurity.Some conflict analysts assert that
the civil wars that proliferated in Africa and elsewhere in the
1990s are now reaching peace settlements and the countries
affected are entering the postconflict reconstruction phase.
While the number and intensity of conflicts in Africa have
declined during the past few years,peace appears to be
breaking out only if hostilities do not resume in former areas
of long-term,high-intensity conflict such as Angola,Liberia,
Sierra Leone,and Ethiopia.Local and lower-intensity conflicts
continue in some of these countries,notably Ethiopia,and may
scale up.Peace negotiations in zones of conflict and severe
food insecurity,such as the Democratic Republic of the
Congo (DRC) and Sudan,may well break down,as may shaky
ceasefires such as the current one in Liberia.Meanwhile,con-
flict rages on in Burundi and northern Uganda,leaving millions
uprooted and malnourished.Impoverished countries such as
Tanzania bear the heavy burden of receiving refugees from
wars in neighboring countries.
In postconflict countries such as Mozambique, the con-
sequences of previous wars exact a toll on food security and
economic development long after the end of fighting, as
combatants deliberately destroyed agricultural production
capacity, markets, health posts, and human and social capital.
Despite more than a decade of peace and favorable eco-
nomic growth, Mozambique is still hampered by landmines
and unexploded ordnance that continue to kill and maim
agricultural workers and make land hazardous to farm.
Roads, schools, and teachers, all decimated by conflict,
remain in short supply, and the country, like all of Sub-
Saharan Africa, now faces the additional labor and food secu-
rity challenge of HIV/AIDS.
As the table indicates, most of the conflict and postcon-
flict countries in Sub-Saharan Africa are home to substantial
numbers of food-insecure people. In most cases, the popula-
tion in need of food and other emergency humanitarian
assistance accounts for only a small share of the total food-
insecure population. Hence,African conflict countries are
zones of high, chronic food insecurity.
PRIMARY AGRICULTURAL PRODUCT 
EXPORTS AS SOURCES OF
GRIEVANCE,GREED, AND GUNS
M
uch of the conflict analysis of the 1980s and 1990s
argued that the causes of conflict wedded some combi-
nation of identity politics to perceived scarcity of primary
resources (“grievance”). Recent studies of civil war, however,
have found that competition for control over such primary
commodities as oil or diamonds (“greed”) is a far more sig-
nificant precipitating factor.The point is not that reliance on
primary-product exports necessarily causes conflict and food
insecurity.Rather,in politically volatile settings characterized
by poverty and inequality, global trade in these high-value
commodities creates conditions that increase the likelihood
of conflict. Primary-product revenues then fund military
expenditures.
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       Although most of these studies of greed and grievance
have concentrated on nonrenewable,nonagricultural
resources,high-value agricultural resources may also be impli-
cated in at least two ways.First,competing political-ethnic
groups may fight over access to land and water sources to
produce high-value commodities such as coffee and cotton.
Alternatively,a sudden precipitous decline in the price of cash
crops—such as coffee and cotton,again—may cause cata-
strophic losses of income and drive would-be farmers into
more violent military and illicit trade occupations because
they see no other option.For example,in Rwanda,competi-
tion over land and access to agricultural improvement pro-
grams directly preceded the genocidal violence of 1994,and
the plummeting price of coffee was clearly a contributing 
factor not only to low and falling incomes but also to the
conflict itself,which was yet another chapter in the country’s
violent history of strife between and within ethnic groups.
Under the right conditions,agricultural exports can pro-
vide small farmers with opportunities to earn income,
enhance food security,and improve household nutrition,as in
Uganda,where small farmers’ export production has been
accompanied by poverty reduction and increased staple food
output.But public policies must ensure that these small farm-
ers have access to land and other productive resources,mar-
kets,and infrastructure if they are to benefit from export-
crop production.Agricultural production and trade can be
expected to lessen or counteract incentives for violence only
when other internal political stressors,such as intergroup
competition over resources,are absent.Otherwise,primary
agricultural commodity production may contribute contextual
or trigger causes of conflict.
The principal way in which trade in primary agricultural
commodities may contribute to food insecurity and conflict is
through global and national overexpansion of production of
particular cash crops.Prices plunge,and with them fall the
livelihoods,living standards,and hopes for the future of those
who have become dependent on their income.Since the
1990s,coffee and cotton prices have fluctuated hugely,in
some years dipping to half of prior levels and carrying down
with them the livelihood expectations of small farmers.The
extent to which such losses are politically destabilizing
depends on preexisting political and socioeconomic contexts,
as is seen in the Central American contrast between the dis-
tribution of land,coffee production improvements,and profits
among small-farmer operations in Costa Rica and the more
skewed distribution favoring privileged,elite,large-scale
landowners in El Salvador.In El Salvador,struggles over more
equitable access to land and coffee-production capacities
fueled decades of bloody civil war.
It is evident in Central America that coffee is the agricul-
tural commodity with the clearest connections to violent
conflict. Its conflict potential has been less intensively
explored in Africa and Asia,where nonagricultural commodi-
ties have absorbed trade and conflict analysts’ attention.In
2000,coffee was the second-largest export commodity in
developing countries after petroleum.Moreover,coffee
accounts for a substantial share of export earnings in the
conflict and postconflict countries listed in the table:50 per-
cent for Ethiopia and over 60 percent for Burundi.Control of
revenues from the “bitter brew” is a source of both greed
and grievance in Africa.Historically,coffee revenue supported
Idi Amin’s bloody dictatorship in Uganda,rebel forces in Sierra
Leone,and Ethiopia’s changing spectrum of political leaders.
In some cases,primary-commodity pricing and policies
also fuel tensions over access to land,water,and markets
while diminishing food security,thereby contributing to con-
flict potential.Reliance on primary-commodity exports brings
opportunities for income,but also the risk of external shocks,
especially when there is little diversification in exports,a lack
of effective leadership and good governance,or both.The like-
lihood of strife increases as a result of declines in both house-
hold and national income.While sometimes a source of greed
(with the revenues used to purchase arms),export crops can,
like food crops,suffer declines due to conflict,thus constrain-
ing national revenues for investment in peaceful development.





he international community,through its influence on
national food,agriculture,and trade policy,can do much
to help prevent the outbreak of conflict.International financial
institutions responsible for development loans and debt relief
can pressure government leaders to use foreign exchange
earnings for food and nutrition programs,education,health
care,and broad-based agricultural development,rather than
weapons purchases.Debt relief in Côte d’Ivoire and other
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    African countries was designed to limit the use of these 
transfer payments to finance food imports and prevent arms
acquisitions.
International sanctions and regulations can also make it
less lucrative for rebels to exploit primary resources.UN
efforts to control the flow of “blood” diamonds,through the
Kimberly program,engage the global diamond trade in certify-
ing the origin of gems.Conflict diamonds have funded military
operations in the DRC,Sierra Leone,and Angola,as well as
the operations of international terrorist groups.The interna-
tional community could,in an analogous manner,encourage
“fair trade,” that is,the purchase in developed countries of
export crops produced,processed,and marketed under equi-
table conditions by small farmers in developing countries.
Other international agreements and initiatives could like-
wise promote peace and food security.The convention ban-
ning land mines plays an active but not yet sufficient role in
making farming safer in postconflict countries.Improvements
in famine early-warning systems and emergency nutrition
interventions—building on global integration of information
and communications technology and transportation—enhance
the international community’s ability to detect and respond to
food crises.But relief and development assistance must pro-
mote and protect livelihoods,especially the livelihoods of
those whose only other option is the war economy.Education
and employment interventions must pay attention especially to
disaffected youth,including those in households that have lost
income due to plunges in export crop prices,lest these youth
become cheap labor recruits for additional cycles of violence.
Because most Africans affected by conflicts live in rural
areas,many or most relief and postconflict development
efforts focus on restoring,rehabilitating,and enhancing agricul-
tural potential.Settling people into labor-intensive farming is
thought of as a good way to start building markets and civil
society,because farming probably requires the least capital
investment and infrastructure.Subsistence and cash-crop
(including livestock) incomes are considered the main peaceful
alternatives to military employment or involvement in the war
economy in environments in which other sources of invest-
ment are lacking.But projects and programs designed to gen-
erate local livelihoods and national economic recovery and
growth must contend with structural inequalities that heighten
intergroup struggles for land,water,credit,crop-improvement
technology,and markets—competitions that can lead to addi-
tional conflict.Furthermore,it may not be a simple proposition
to integrate former combatants,who are mostly male,into the
agricultural sector,where women traditionally dominate food-
crop production and engage in export-crop labor.
“Livelihood-security” efforts consider food security as a
problem of household access to food.They examine the
diverse ways in which males and females in otherwise food-
insecure households manage resources to gain livelihoods and
food without loss of life in potential famine situations,and to
smooth consumption over insecure seasons.Livelihood-
security approaches also pay careful attention to the division
of labor in production and differences in the distribution of
food,to make sure no one is left out—a rights-based
approach.Both livelihood and rights-based strategies involve
analysis and program implementation in smaller-scale social
units,such as communities or districts,rather than whole
countries or regions.These strategies point out the limita-
tions of national or international political economy studies,
which in many cases (such as that of Ethiopia) have failed to
look below the level of the state at the distorting impacts of
food aid and other assistance.
Rights-based approaches analyze existing social-structural,
ethnic,and power relations and aim to deliver services and
meet basic needs in ways that include all social agents.A
rights-based approach begins with a deep respect for the
inherent dignity of all human beings who are potential benefi-
ciaries and requires program implementers to work closely
with communities to help people understand their basic
rights and find ways to articulate rights demands through pro-
gram participation.Agriculture and rural development proj-
ects can deter conflict,but only if they help construct social
contexts that promote greater equity.
POLICY IMPLICATIONS
1.
It is essential to monitor the impact of the global
prices of developing countries’ key agricultural
exports, such as coffee and cotton.The trade regula-
tions and market structure for particular agricultural
commodities may also prove important when coun-
5
              Photo credits:
Cover photo © 2004 Panos Pictures/Jacob Silberberg
Page 2 © 2004 Panos Pictures/Paul Lowe
Page 4 © 2004 Panos Pictures/Sven Torfinn  
Page 5 © 2004 Panos Pictures/Crispin Hughes 
INTERNATIONAL FOOD 
POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE
2033 K Street, NW 
Washington, DC 20006-1002 USA
Telephone: +1-202-862-5600  
Fax: +1-202-467-4439
Email: ifpri@cgiar.org  
www.ifpri.org
This brief was prepared for the conference on "Assuring Food and Nutrition Security in Africa by 2020:
Prioritizing Actions, Strengthening Actors, and Facilitating Partnerships," held in Kampala, Uganda,April 1-3, 2004
<www.ifpri.org/2020africaconference>.The conference was organized by the 2020 Vision Initiative of the
International Food Policy Research Institute, hosted by The Government of Uganda, and cosponsored by:
European Commission (EC) • Centre de coopération internationale en recherche agronomique pour le
développement (CIRAD) • Centre Technique de Coopération Agricole et Rurale (CTA) • Deutsche
Welthungerhilfe (German Agro Action) • Development Cooperation Ireland • Federal Ministry of Economic Co-
operation and Development, Germany, with Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), and
Internationale Weiterbildung und Entwicklung (InWEnt) • Ministère des Affaires étrangères, France • Regional
Land Management Unit (RELMA) • The Rockefeller Foundation • Sasakawa Africa Association • United States
Agency for International Development (USAID) • World Food Programme (WFP) • World Vision International
The views expressed in this brief are those of the author(s) and not necessarily endorsed by or representative of IFPRI or of
the cosponsoring or supporting organizations.
Copyright © 2004 International Food Policy Research Institute. All rights reserved. Sections of this brief may be reproduced
without the express permission of, but with acknowledgment to, the International Food Policy Research Institute.
Contact ifpri-copyright@cgiar.org for permission to reprint.
www.ifpri.org/2020africaconference
tries depend heavily on a single export crop that is
subject to sudden price declines.These factors also
have a bearing on more widespread human-rights vio-
lations and livelihood disruptions.They need greater
emphasis in development-agency assessments, which
tend to focus on national production and trade statis-
tics.The idea, advanced by the World Bank, of a com-
pensatory fund merits further development.This
would assist the “losers” from globalization in adjusting
and diversifying their sources of income.The elimina-
tion of developed-country subsidies and tariff protec-
tion could also help reduce economic shocks, conflict
potential, and the need for humanitarian assistance.
2.
Donors must provide aid—whether emergency
humanitarian assistance in active conflict situations or
agricultural development aid in postconflict coun-
tries—in an inclusive manner, without reinforcing local
and regional power structures that promise more
conflict. Humanitarian food aid programs must moni-
tor the distorting effects of external subsidized grain
flows on agricultural production and trade in recipient
countries.
3.
Policymakers must pay attention to low-intensity and
local conflicts.These struggles, often over access to
agricultural resources, can establish pockets of discon-
tent, reduce food production significantly, and flare up
into greater conflicts.
4.
The positive or negative effects of economic liberaliza-
tion, much debated among policy analysts, are due less
to trade and more to the structures of production
and markets, and to a policy context that determines
peaceful or belligerent outcomes. Efforts to promote
liberalization must take all these factors into account.
5.
The “livelihood-security” and “rights-based develop-
ment” frameworks offer positive ways to analyze and
strategize conflict response and prevention at the
local level, but it is essential to link local efforts more
effectively to national political-economic programs.
Some aid donors and nongovernmental organizations
have begun integrating these approaches into their
development activities and efforts to provide emer-
gency aid.
National governments in Africa, together with global
investors, whether private or public (aid donors), must
include conflict-prevention considerations in the planning,
implementation, and evaluation of development programs
and projects.They should calculate savings from conflict
avoidance as part of the returns to development spending.
Such an approach can help break the links between conflict
and food insecurity.
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and R.Väyrynen,eds.,War,Hunger,and Displacement:The Origins
of Humanitarian Emergencies,2 vols.(Oxford:Oxford University
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